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Abstract: The aim of the paper is to explore the cultural context of the conflict in 
eastern Ukraine. From this perspective, the conflict in Donbas has to be seen not 
only in the context of a political game, socio-economic transition and geopolitical 
interests, but also in the light of a cultural conflict rooted in history. According to 
Ukrainian researcher Mykola Riabchuk, Ukraine is divided, not between ethnic Rus-
sians and Ukrainians, but between two different types of Ukrainian identity. These 
profound differences have been exacerbated by the events of the “Euromaidan” and, 
subsequently, the violent conflict between the separatist forces of the self-declared 
Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics on the one hand and the post-revolutionary 
Ukrainian government on the other. This article focuses on how the cultural divisions 
of Ukrainian society have been used since the beginning of Ukrainian independence 
by the political elite as a tool of symbolic politics, contributing to the mass mobiliza-
tion of Ukrainian society and the outbreak of a violent conflict.
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Introduction1
Most contemporary armed conflicts not only revolve around different interests but are accompanied by different kind of clashes in the 
symbolic arena. Religion, collective identity, language, beliefs, values, 
symbols, attitude to the past and visions of the future may be considered 
as sources of conflict, but also as “weapons of war,” helping to mobi-
lize and legitimize military actions. The phenomenon of war is rooted 
in a specific culture and cultural perception of society, and, associated 
with the experience of past conflicts, defines the framework for interpret-
ing events and giving specific meaning to them. Furthermore, cultural 
content, such as symbols, myths, values and ideas, which are identifiable 
1 The article was written under the project sponsored by the Faculty of Philoso-
phy, Jagiellonian University, within the grant to support the development of young 
faculty members (K/DSC/004795).
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by the members of particular societies, are eagerly exploited by warring 
factions as ammunition during the struggle (cf. Jacoby, 2008; Kaufman, 
2001; Scherrer, 2003). Therefore, focusing on the relations of war and 
culture contributes not only to the understanding of the mechanisms of 
these relations, but also the causes and course of specific wars.
The conflict in Eastern Ukraine, also known as the war in Donbas, has 
been taking place since April 2014 between the new Ukrainian authori-
ties, elected as a result of mass social protests, known as the Euromaidan 
and the Revolution of Dignity, and the separatists from two eastern prov-
inces of the country who are supported by the Russian Federation (Onuch, 
Sasse, 2016; Yekelchyk, 2015). One might perceive the war in Donbas in 
the context of Ukrainian-Russian relations, geopolitical rivalry between 
Russia and the “West,” and the struggle between the Ukrainian political 
elite which is strongly related to economic and regional structures (cf. 
Katchanovski, 2016; Sakwa, 2016; Wilson, 2016; Wood et al., 2015). 
Other commentators and scholars perceive and interpret the outbreak of 
violent conflict in Ukraine through the prism of the “identity war” be-
tween “Eastern” and “Western,” “Pro-Russian” and “Pro-European” or 
“Creole” and “National” Ukraine (Riabchuk, 2015a; Voznyak, 2014; cf. 
Wilson, 2016, p. 632; Zhurzhenko, 2014, p. 249).
Being aware of this complexity, I believe that an analysis of the Ukrain-
ian crisis from the perspective of a conflict that is being waged in a certain 
cultural context, and in which the cultural content is used by the various 
players to defeat their enemy, can contribute to a better understanding 
of current events. This article focuses on how the cultural divisions of 
Ukrainian society from the beginning of Ukrainian independence are used 
by the political elite in the process of gaining and maintaining power. Re-
gional antagonisms and prejudices were an effective factor in mobilizing 
voters in the political campaigns. Also, in the latest events, fixed intra-
state stereotypes and collective fears related to them have proven to be an 
effective tool of symbolic politics, contributing to the mass mobilization 
of Ukrainian society, and the outbreak of a violent conflict.
Divided Ukraine: Identity and Politics
The diversity and heterogeneity of Ukrainian society is sometimes re-
duced to a simple division: ethnic (Ukrainian majority and the Russian 
minority), linguistic (Russian language and Ukrainian language) or reli-
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gious (Orthodox Ukraine and “Catholic” Ukraine or differences between 
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and the 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyivan Patriarchate). The line of such 
a division is sometimes drawn along the line of the Zbruch River or the 
Dniepr River, which divides the state into Western and Eastern Ukraine. 
From this point of view, the bipolar geographical/regional divide corre-
lates with ethnicity, language and religion (cf. Shulman, 1999, p. 1012).
In fact, the diversity of Ukrainian society is much more complicat-
ed and cannot be tied to simple polarizations. Although Russians are 
the largest ethnic minority in Ukraine (17.3% in 2001, according to the 
All-Ukrainian	population	census data; and 6% in 2017 according to the 
Razumkov Centre survey, conducted in all regions of Ukraine except 
Crimea and the occupied areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts [Os-
novni	zasady	i	shlyakhy	formuvannya	spil’noyi	identychnosti	hromadyan	
Ukrayiny, 2017, p. 26]), the country is inhabited by numerous groups of 
Poles, Belarusians, Hungarians, Tatars, Moldovans, Jews and Bulgarians. 
In addition, many citizens of Ukraine have a problem assigning them-
selves categorically to one particular ethnic group (Wilson, 2002, p. 32; 
cf. Kulyk, 2013). Dual ethnicity and polyethnicity, as well as distanc-
ing from ethnic self-identification is still an important aspect of ethnic 
identity formation in Ukraine, as the latest surveys have shown (Osnovni	
zasady..., 2017, p. 26).
The issue of linguistic divisions in Ukraine is also highly complex. 
Instead of a simple bipolar division into Ukrainians and Russians, Wil-
son (2002, pp. 35–36) distinguished three main language-ethnical groups: 
Russophone Russians (approximately 20–21%), Russophone Ukrainians 
(33–34%) and Ukrainophone Ukrainians (40%). Obviously, this division 
should be complemented by a mosaic of other national minorities who are 
increasingly keen to use their own language (cf. Charnysh, 2013, p. 1). 
Besides, there is a large bilingual (both Ukrainian and Russian-speaking) 
population in Ukraine (Riabchuk, 2012, p. 443), as well as those who use 
the “surzhyk” – i.e. different varieties of the Ukrainian-Russian and Rus-
sian-Ukrainian dialects (Wilson, 2002, p. 36; cf. Osnovni	zasady..., 2017, 
p. 27). It is also difficult to draw a clear geographical border between 
Ukrainian-speaking Ukraine and Russian-speaking Ukraine, although in 
fact the Ukrainian language prevails in the west and in the centre of the 
country, and Russian in the east and south; generally speaking, the rural 
population in all regions prefer to speak Ukrainian, and the urban popula-
tion – also in the centre – Russian or “surzhyk” (Olszański, 2014, p. 11; 
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cf. Osnovni	zasady..., 2017, p. 27). What’s more, according to surveys, 
“there is no direct correlation between the preferred language of everyday 
communication and the political or geopolitical orientation of the specific 
person” (Portnov, 2015, p. 725; cf. Kulyk, 2016).
This is because some researchers talk about not ethno-linguistic di-
visions, but rather – identity divisions of Ukrainian society (cf. Kulyk, 
2016). According to Ukrainian intellectual and political analyst Mykola 
Riabchuk (2015a, p. 138), there is an ideological line between differ-
ent types of Ukrainian identity: “European” and “East Slavonic.” Both 
Ukrainian nations “considered themselves as ‘Ukrainian’, but refused the 
same ‘authentic’ status to their regional/linguistic-cultural alter ego” (Ria-
bchuk, 2015b). The geographic centers of these two nations are Lviv and 
Donetsk, which developed contradictory identity projects. Both projects 
correspond with different visions of the Ukrainian nation’s past and fu-
ture, and refer to different civilizational patterns. However, as researchers 
note, this bipolar division into “two Ukraines” should be treated with cau-
tion, rather as an analytical model than as a reflection of the divisions of 
contemporary Ukrainian society (cf. Portnov, 2016, p. 108; Zhurzhenko, 
2014, p. 249).
Nonetheless, it should be noted that the cultural differences between 
the regions since the beginning of Ukrainian independence translate into 
the political choices of their residents. Residents of western Ukraine are 
more active and more likely to support civic movements postulating 
democratization of the country according to a Western model than resi-
dents of south-eastern Ukraine. As Mark Beissinger (2014 cited in Petro, 
2015, pp. 28–29) notes, participants in the Orange Revolution of 2004 
were eight times more likely to be from Western Ukraine, and 92 per-
cent claimed Ukrainian as their native language. Also, in the 2013–2014 
protests known as the Euromaidan, Western Ukrainians played a promi-
nent role. In Western regions, support for the protests reached 80 percent 
(Petro, 2015, p. 29). These regions consistently supported pro-Western 
candidates in presidential elections: Leonid Kravchuk rather than Leo-
nid Kuchma in 1994, Kuchma rather than the communist candidate Petro 
Symonenko in 1999, Yushchenko in 2004 and Tymoshenko in 2010 (cf. 
Marples, 2015, p. 11).
Voting patterns in Donbas and Crimea stand out as being nearly the 
converse of those in Galicia. The differences manifest themselves also “in 
the visceral rejection of the ethnic nationalism that is popular in regions of 
western Ukraine like Galicia, and in the affirmation of a Ukrainian iden-
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tity that is inextricably linked to Russian culture” (Petro, 2015, p. 28). 
In 2004, the opponents of the Orange Revolution were overwhelmingly 
from the East, primarily from Donetsk, and three times more likely to 
speak Russian at home (Beissinger, 2014 cited in Petro, 2015, p. 29). The 
same pattern re-emerged in 2014. In the east of Ukraine support for the 
protests reached only 30 percent and 20 percent in the south (Petro, 2015, 
p. 29).
Different electoral preferences are related to a different political cul-
ture rooted in the different history of the regions (cf. Osipian, Osipian, 
2012; Portnov, 2016). The Western provinces had been part of the Polish-
Lithuanian state (Rzeczpospolita) and, after 1867, of the Austro-Hungari-
an Empire. Hence, the influence of the Western model of civilization, pro-
moting values such as the rule of law, local governments, the European 
educational system, independent judiciary, and a contractual relationship 
between rulers and subjects. This was conducive to the emergence of na-
tionalist tendencies chosen for the all-Ukrainian project of nation-build-
ing. In these areas, the colonial Russian/Soviet policy met with different 
practices of political, social and cultural traditions, making it difficult to 
incorporate these areas into parts of the Russian and then Soviet empire. 
Years of “Sovietization” and the brutal policy of fighting attempts not 
only to revive Ukrainian nationalism, but also all manifestations of civili-
zational “otherness,” deepened the reluctance towards “Russianness” (cf. 
Olszański, 2014, p. 9; Kiryukhin, 2015).
In the south-eastern regions of Ukraine, the assimilation of Russian 
traditions and institutions was a lot easier. These lands of the former Great 
Steppe were annexed to the Russian Empire by the end of the eighteenth 
century. In the Donbas, with Europe’s largest coal basin and the related 
local industry that developed, integration with the Russian state proceed-
ed without hindrance, especially since many Russian settlers arrived there 
(Petro, 2015, pp. 22–26). As a result, the “Eastern” region, “which in-
cludes the current regions of Crimea, Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkov, 
Kherson, Lugansk, Odessa, Nikolayevsk, and Zaporozhe, forms a rela-
tively compact ethnic and cultural community that is distinguished by 
the strong influence of Russian culture, even where the majority of the 
population defines itself as Ukrainian” (Petro, 2015, p. 20). Ukrainian 
pro-Russian/Soviet identity was institutionalized in the years of the So-
viet Union. As a result, according to Taras Kuzio, “a quarter of Donetsk 
residents identify themselves as belonging to a Soviet cultural group” 
(2010, pp. 291–292).
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However, it should be noted that support for Ukrainian nationalism 
gradually moved from Western to Central Ukraine. Starting from the 
2000s, the electoral base of the liberal-democratic, pro-Western forces 
expanded to Central Ukraine, as shown by the result of the presidential 
elections in 2010 and 2014 (see election maps in Vasylchenko, 2005; cf. 
Kuzio, 2010, p. 291). The main dividing line has shifted eastwards and 
now, according to research conducted by Volodymyr Kulyk (2016; cf. 
Marples, 2015, pp. 11–12), lies between the Donbas and the adjacent east-
southern regions.
From Cultural Conflict to Armed Violence
The existence of different projects of identity which claim the right 
to define what is modern Ukraine and who is a contemporary Ukrain-
ian since the beginning of independence, created the potential conditions 
for conflict and the disintegration of the state. Nevertheless, for nearly 
25 years after Ukraine’s independence, these divisions did not result in 
an open conflict. Despite strong regional differences, different political 
preferences and the existence of various narratives concerning Ukrainian 
identity, the will for territorial integrity and to build a common Ukrainian 
state prevailed (cf. Wilson, 2000, p. 169).
However, in Ukraine, just as in other former Soviet republics, identity 
categories were used by the political elite in the process of gaining and 
maintaining power (Castells, 1997; Zhurzhenko, 2014, pp. 251–252). The 
construct of “national identity” has proven to be a convenient tool to take 
control of state institutions as an effective weapon in the fight against 
communist ideology. The “national-democratic project” contributed to 
the international and internal legitimacy of the post-Soviet nomenclature. 
Also, the regional division of Ukraine and the threat of its disintegration 
were used in order to legitimize and perpetuate the power of the post-
Soviet political elites. Atomized and mired in stagnation and economic 
problems – society was an easy object of manipulation. Since the early 
1990s, the cultural conflict between the two projects of Ukrainian iden-
tity was used in a political game, hindering intra-Ukrainian dialogue and 
contributing to deeper divisions between the mythologized “East” and 
“West” (cf. Riabchuk, 2002; Zhurzhenko, 2014).
Regional antagonisms proved to be an effective factor in mobilizing 
voters in the political campaigns also during the presidential elections in 
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2004. Ukrainian society, dissatisfied with the direction of economic and 
political transformation and the incompetence of the authorities began to 
demand changes (cf. Razumkov Centre’s data cited in Konieczna, 2005, 
p. 22). A broad national democratic base was consolidated under the lead-
ership of the very popular former Prime Minister, Victor Yushchenko. He 
clashed in the last stage of the elections with the incumbent Prime Minis-
ter Viktor Yanukovych, former governor of the Donetsk Oblast. Accord-
ing to the official Central Election Commission results announced on No-
vember 23, the runoff election was won by Viktor Yanukovych. However 
the election results were challenged, since the election was claimed to 
be marred by massive corruption, voter intimidation and direct electoral 
fraud. The subsequent events led to a political crisis in Ukraine and major 
civic protests, known as the Orange Revolution.
According to Tadeusz Olszański, the main axis of confrontation of 
Victor Yanukovych and Victor Yushchenko was to preserve the exist-
ing rules of the political game, or opening the possibility of a significant 
change (Olszański, 2005, p. 5). However, regional divisions and fixed in-
tra-Ukrainian stereotypes were often used by both candidates to discredit 
the opponent. Both for Yushchenko and Yanukovych, Ukraine’s regional 
division coincided with the moral distinction between “true” and “fake” 
Ukraine (Riabchuk, 2015a, p. 146; Wolczuk, 2007; Zhurzhenko, 2014, 
p. 254). The Orange Revolution is defined by Shulman (2005) as a clash 
of two competing nationalisms, “ethnic Ukrainian” and “eastern Slavic.” 
Shulman concluded that the former supported domestic reform and in-
tegration into Europe, while the latter was less supportive of reform and 
more cautious towards Ukraine’s integration with the West. Orange Rev-
olution protestors, who were pro-Western advocates of democratization 
and opponents of authoritarianism in Ukraine, were contrasted with their 
opponents, who looked nostalgically to a paternalistic Soviet past (Kuzio, 
2010, p. 290). Hence, supporters and opponents of the anti-regime pro-
tests were divided not because of ethnic and linguistic categories, but 
a cultural collective memory related to identity and visions of the future 
of the Ukrainian state.
The final winner of the 2004 election, Victor Yushchenko attempted 
to build a new nation on the exploits of anti-Soviet, national heroes such 
as Stepan Bandera who was a leader of the nationalist and independ-
ence movement of Ukraine, and Roman Shukhevych, a military leader 
and general of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Both Bandera and 
Shukhevych were awarded the posthumous title of Hero of Ukraine by 
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the President, which was a very controversial decision and aroused pro-
tests not only among international public opinion, but in Ukraine itself 
(Marples, 2015, p. 15). Under Yushchenko’s presidency, a new nation-
al narrative connected with the experience of the collective tragedy of 
the Ukrainian nation, was universally propagated (cf. Kiryukhin, 2015, 
pp. 64–65). His most resonant initiatives in the field of identity and mem-
ory politics included the establishment of a Museum of Soviet Occupa-
tion, the commemoration of the 75th anniversary of the Holodomor and 
the institutionalization of “state memory politics by creating the Institute 
of National Remembrance and assigning the Ukrainian Security Service 
(SBU) additional functions such as controlling archives, conducting his-
torical research, and popularizing the new official approach to the Soviet 
past” (Zhurzhenko, 2014, p. 254).
The attempt to realize a project of identity based largely on restoring 
“national dignity” and re-interpreting the past was received by a large 
part of Ukrainians as a threat to their identity, values and traditions. Re-
placing elements of the Russian-Soviet identity narrative with Ukrainian 
elements met strong opposition, especially among the inhabitants of the 
southern and eastern parts of the country (cf. Kulyk, 2016, p. 593). Fur-
thermore, the “Orange Camp” turned out to be divided and failed to de-
liver on its promises. The winner of the presidential election in 2010 was 
Viktor Yanukovych. The new Ukrainian authorities tried to weaken the 
pro-Western, pro-market, and pro-democratic orientation and “replace it 
with the Russian-Soviet-East Slavonic identity, profoundly anti-Western 
and anti-liberal, that is well established in Russia and Belarus,” Riabchuk 
claims (2012, p. 445). The new government launched a gradual re-So-
vietization of Ukrainian symbolic space, commemorative practices, and 
textbooks (Riabchuk, 2015a, p. 147). In August 2012, President Viktor 
Yanukovych signed a language law, which enabled local councils to el-
evate the status of any minority language spoken by at least 10% of the 
population to “official” and allow it to be used in governmental, edu-
cational and cultural institutions alongside Ukrainian. Although the new 
law was in full accordance with the norms of the European Charter for 
Regional or Minority Languages, it caused huge protests, mainly in the 
west of the country (cf. Pogrebinskiy, 2015, p. 95).
Opposition to the government’s language policy boosted the electoral 
fortunes of radical nationalist groups. According to Kiryukhin, a national 
discourse focused on fighting against the enemy became the most com-
mon type of Ukrainian nationalism. This narrative “emphasizes the fight 
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for the political and social rights of ethnic Ukrainians against the cor-
rupted government and the oligarchs, and, at the same time, the fight for 
extending the living space of ethnic Ukrainians who are ‘constrained’ in 
their own country” (Kiryukhin, 2015, p. 65). The cult of national heroes 
and idea of ethnocracy are important elements of that movement. After 
2004, Ukrainian far-right parties gained wider support in Ukraine and 
in the parliamentary election of 2012 the far-right party Svoboda won 
10 percent of the votes. According to the official Party Manifesto from 
2009, the goal of the party was to build “a powerful Ukrainian State based 
on the principles of social and national justice” (Prohrama, 2009). The 
party requested a radical lustration, aimed at eliminating the employees 
of state structures who were active before 1991. This was accompanied 
by a request for the total decommunization of public space (monuments, 
names of streets and places, etc.) and the demand for an apology from the 
Russian government for their communist crimes. The political manifesto 
of that party was extremely anti-liberal, both in economic as well as po-
litical terms and this was the main reason for its great success, Olszański 
claims (2012, p. 1; cf. Charnysh, 2013, p. 3).
The competition of two types of “radicalisms,” national and post-
Soviet, was not conducive to the stabilization of the political situation 
in the country. From the end of 2013, these profound differences were 
exacerbated by the events of the Euromaidan. The Euromaidan upris-
ing brought thousands of Ukrainians of many different political views 
together in Kyiv, not only to protest President Yanukovych’s decision to 
postpone the EU Association Agreement, but also to denounce domestic 
corruption and repression. Since there was no immediate institutional or 
political response to people’s hopes and demands, the protests began to 
grow and spread throughout Ukraine. The government’s decision to use 
violence against the protesters marked the beginning of a dramatic cycle 
of political mobilization and escalation (cf. Onuch, Sasse, 2016; Kuzio, 
2015). In February 2014, President Yanukovych was forced out of office 
and the following month, Russia annexed the Crimea. This was followed 
by the “Russian Spring” – the launch of a separatist rebellion that targeted 
the eight Russophone oblasts of Eastern and Southern Ukraine that tradi-
tionally favored stronger relations with Russia than with Europe (Sakwa, 
2016, p. 155; cf. Osipian, Osipian, 2012). Pro-Russian and anti-govern-
ment demonstrations in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine es-
calated, and in May 2014 the separatists, supported by the Russian Fed-
eration, were able to declared the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of 
32	 Elżbieta	Olzacka	 ŚSP 4 ’17
Donetsk and People’s Republic of Luhansk (O’Loughlin, Toal, Kolosov, 
2017, p. 125). The conflict in Donbas quickly descended into a war, when 
the acting Ukrainian President, Oleksandr Turchynov, vowed to launch an 
“anti-terrorist operation” (ATO) against separatist movements (Wilson, 
2016; Wood et al., 2015). It should be borne in mind that with almost 
10,000 deaths, over 20,000 injured, more than 1.6 million people dis-
placed domestically and internationally and almost four million in need 
of humanitarian assistance (European Commission 2017), the Ukrainian 
conflict has become the largest humanitarian tragedy that Europe has wit-
nessed since the wars in the Balkans in the 1990s.
Culture as Ammunition
To create the image of the enemy, legitimize violence and mobi-
lize people to fight, participants in the events in Ukraine use symbols, 
discourses, images and military models rooted in the past. The East-
ern Ukrainian separatists are trying to mobilize people to fight under 
the banner of a common Russian-Soviet narrative identity and fear 
of Ukrainian nationalism. Symbols used by the participants in the so-
called anti-Maidan in Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk were both flags of 
the USSR as well as the white-blue-red flag of modern Russia, some-
times with a golden double-headed eagle. After the proclamation of the 
“sovereign” People’s Republics, the Russian flag disappeared and their 
own symbolism – albeit referring to the Russian cultural universe – was 
developed. The hallmark of the separatists was also pinned to clothing 
– the black and orange St. George’s ribbon, a symbol that refers to the 
tsarist and Soviet military decorations, and which is used in the post-
Soviet area to expose the relationship with the Russian/Soviet national 
identification (Stryjek, 2014, pp. 40–41). The development of national-
ism which refers to the Eastern Slavic, Russian and Soviet categories 
is ideologically and organizationally supported by the structure of Rus-
sian	World (Russkiy	Mir), a Russian government-funded organization 
aimed at promoting the Russian culture and language, and values that 
challenge the Western cultural tradition (Kudors, 2010; Yablons’kyi, 
2014). The identity politics pursued by the People’s Republics “drew 
on neo-Soviet symbols and narratives (such as the Great Patriotic War), 
conservative Russian Orthodox values, and the communist ethos of 
hardworking people who ‘feed the rest of Ukraine’, as well as on the 
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notion that the Russian language and culture needed ‘protection from 
the Ukrainian nationalists’” (Zhurzhenko, 2014, p. 255).
The old Soviet stereotypes of the inhabitants of eastern Galicia as trai-
tors, fighting the Red Army on the side of the Third Reich, were activated 
again and, as a consequence of the war in Donbas, became an element of 
“information warfare” and propaganda activities. According to Tatiana 
Zhurzhenko (2014, p. 255), “popular clichés and stereotypes about the 
‘fascist threat’ posed by ‘nationalist’ Galicia” poisoned the public dis-
course from the Orange Revolution. Therefore, participants in Euromaid-
an and later, the supporters of the post-Maidan government are portrayed 
as “nationalists,” “fascists” and even “Nazi sympathizers” who discrimi-
nate against ethnic Russians and Russian speakers who have strong his-
torical ties to Russia, the Russian language and traditions (Kuzio, 2015, 
p. 116). The new authorities in Kiev came to be called a “fascist junta” 
and “banderivtsi” (Olszański, 2015, p. 3).
Indeed, during the protests on the Maidan, symbolism taken from the 
tradition of the formation fighting for the independence of Ukraine, from 
Sich Riflemen to the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and 
Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), was enthusiastically used. National-
ist discourse, using clear language and patterns of heroic struggle for 
freedom, corresponded to social demands during the revolution (Stryjek, 
2014, p. 36). Although at the beginning of the protests, the OUN/UPA’s 
formal greeting Slava	Ukrayini!	Heroyam	slava! (Glory	to	Ukraine!	Glo-
ry	 to	 [her]	Heroes) was taken ambiguously, by many with reluctance, 
and shouted only by radical nationalists, as the events unfolded it became 
widespread (Olszański, 2015, pp. 5–6). The symbolic space of Ukraine, 
of course, with the exception of the Crimea and Donbas, was dominat-
ed by the blue and yellow state flag (cf. Buyskykh, 2016). During the 
protests (though more often in Lviv than in Kiev) the nationalist red-
and-black banner, the symbol of the struggle of the radically nationalist 
OUN, then adopted by the UPA was also used (Stryjek, 2014, pp. 36–39). 
However, according to Tatiana Zhurzhenko (2014, p. 261; cf. Ishchenko, 
2016), “the mass identification with the symbols of radical Ukrainian na-
tionalism does not necessarily mean support for its ideological doctrine; 
it is rather an expression of a defensive identity in the face of aggressive 
Russian propaganda.”
Similarly to the separatists, Ukrainian nationalists, claiming the right 
to the arbitrary decision of who is a “true” Ukrainian, and who is not, use 
stereotypes and clichés towards Ukrainians from the east and south of the 
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country. Donbas is portrayed as “Soviet” and therefore an “alien” region 
of Ukraine (Petro, 2015, p. 27; cf. Portnov, 2016). “The residents of the 
south-east and everyone in general who does not support the mainstream 
narrative are labeled as ‘Moskals’, ‘Little Russians’, a ‘fifth column’” 
Pogrebinskiy claims (2015, p. 96). It is accompanied by “anti-Russian 
hysteria.” The Russophobe organizations are legitimized by the gov-
ernment and its activists are co-opted into the power structures (ibid., 
p. 97).
The war also promotes the formation of the new narrative of historical 
memory, where the key theme is not, as previously, martyrdom (mainly 
the memory of the Holodomor), but the heroic struggle against invaders 
(especially against Russia, but also Poland and Hungary). Importantly, 
the new vision of World War II emphasizes the participation of Ukrain-
ians of different nationalities in the joint fight against the enemy. This 
narrative corresponds to the needs of a country which is at war and try-
ing to integrate an ethnically divided society into a single political na-
tion (Olszański, 2016, p. 5; cf. Kulyk, 2016; Zhurzhenko, 2014). An ex-
pression of the new politics of memory are the Decommunization Laws, 
signed by President Petro Poroshenko on May 15, 2015, which include 
four acts: (1) On the condemnation of Communist and National-Socialist 
(Nazi) totalitarian regimes in Ukraine and a ban on the promotion of their 
symbols; (2) On access to the archives of the repressive agencies of the 
Communist totalitarian regime 1917–1991; (3) On the perpetuation of 
victory over Nazism in World War II 1939–1945; and (4) On the legal 
status of Ukraine’s fight for independence in the 20th century and to honor 
its memory. However, as long as there is no agreement concerning the 
past and future of the Ukrainian nation, patriotic consolidation around 
common heroes of the struggle for the independence of Ukraine will not 
be successful.
Conclusions
This paper discusses the cultural context of the Ukrainian conflict, as 
well as the role of the cultural conflict between two projects of the Ukrain-
ian identity in hindering intra-Ukrainian dialogue and the intensification 
of political strife. It has been shown how stereotypes and symbols rooted 
in history have been used to mobilize mass protests, and then – armed 
struggle. Values, ideas, and ethno-linguistic categories dividing Ukrain-
ŚSP 4 ’17	 Understanding	the	Conflict	in	Eastern	Ukraine:	The	Role...	 35
ians began to be used instrumentally by conflicting parties for waging 
war, and became ammunition during the struggle. Although the cultural 
divisions of Ukrainian society, rooted in the history of the country, cannot 
themselves explain the outbreak of the conflict in Donbas, their analysis 
may contribute to a better understanding of current events.
It should be noted that, according to sociological surveys, before the 
outbreak of the protests in November 2013, there was no popular will for 
any divisions, either in the west of Ukraine, or in the centre and south-
eastern regions (cf. Riabchuk, 2015a; 2012; Charnysh, 2013, p. 10). De-
spite this, Ukraine split into two parts. Although the ethno-linguistic cri-
teria do not form the main axis of division, they proved to be an important 
tool in building the narrative corresponding to the times of war. Violent 
conflict has significantly exacerbated these internal contradictions. The 
war is not conducive to conciliatory attitudes; on the contrary – it favors 
stricter views and stereotypes.
The prospects for rapidly ending the intra-Ukrainian conflict and the 
reintegration of the south-eastern regions within the Ukrainian state seem 
distant. As researchers point out, it is necessary to create a broad concept of 
the “Ukrainian nation,” based on a “civil identity” rather than an “ethnic” 
one (Petro, 2015, p. 32; Zhurzhenko, 2014). Although officially the Ukrain-
ian nation is described as a civil nation, according to Kiryukhin, “school 
curricula, the system of state holidays and social rituals, and the symbolic 
self-representation of the Ukrainian state have invariably included an eth-
nic component” (2015, p. 66; cf. Zhurzhenko, 2002). In such a state many 
citizens could face problems of self-identification and conflicts of identity. 
“National integration could be provided by economic achievements, pride 
in efficient national institutions, democratic citizenship, and rule of law, 
factors that will be difficult to achieve while identity cleavages and con-
frontations remain in place,” Riabchuk claims (2012, p. 446). Nonetheless, 
the divisions will remain in place as long as state policy tries to “press” all 
Ukrainians in a single model of “ethnic identity.”
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Zrozumieć konflikt na wschodzie Ukrainy. Rola kontekstu kulturowego 
 
Streszczenie
Celem artykułu jest poznanie kontekstu kulturowego konfliktu na wschodzie 
Ukrainy. Z tej perspektywy konflikt w Donbasie należy rozpatrywać nie tylko w kon-
tekście gry politycznej, transformacji społeczno-ekonomicznej i interesów geopoli-
tycznych, ale także w świetle zakorzenionego w historii konfliktu kulturowego. We-
dług ukraińskiego badacza, Mykoły Riabczuka, Ukraina jest podzielona nie tyle na 
etnicznych Rosjan i Ukraińców, ile pomiędzy dwa różne typy ukraińskiej tożsamości. 
Różnice te zaostrzyły się wraz z wydarzeniami „Euromajdanu”, a następnie w wyni-
ku konfliktu zbrojnego pomiędzy separatystami z Donieckiej i Ługańskiej Republiki 
Ludowej a nowym rządem Ukrainy. Artykuł koncentruje się na tym, w jaki sposób 
podziały kulturowe ukraińskiego społeczeństwa od początku ukraińskiej niepodległo-
ści są wykorzystywane przez elitę polityczną jako narzędzie polityki symbolicznej, co 
pod koniec 2013 roku doprowadziło do masowej mobilizacji ukraińskiego społeczeń-
stwa i wybuchu konfliktu zbrojnego.
 
Słowa kluczowe: Ukraina, Donbas, Rewolucja Godności, konflikt, podziały kultu-
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